Lebanon’s gross public debt
reached $51.6bn at the end of
January 2010 , up 1.1% from
$51.1bn at end-2009 , and
constituting an increase of 9.9
% from end-January 2009.
Domestic debt increase by 16.6%
to $30.4bn , while external debt
increased by 1.5% annually to
$21.3bn.Local currency debt
accounted for 58.8% of gross
public debt at end-January 2010
compared to 55.4% at end-January
2009,while foreign
currency-denominated debt
represented 41.2% of the total
relative to 44.6% a year
earlier. Market issued Eurobonds
account for about 67% of
external debt. Commercial banks
accounted for about 60%of the
total public debt at the end of
2010 compared to 56% at the end
of 2009. They were followed by
the Central Bank with 19%
relative to 20.1% at end-2009 ,
while public agencies ,
financial institutions and the
general public accounted for
10.5% of the debt relative to
9.7% at
end-2009.Further,multilateral
and bilateral loans represented
5.6% of the debt compared to
6.2% at end-2009 , while other
holders accounted for the
remaining 5.1%. In parallel,
residents held 89.3% of the
public debt at the end of 2010,
up from 85.7% at end-2009. Net
public debt, which excludes the
public sector’s deposits at the
Central Bank and at commercial
banks from overall debt figures
, increased annually by 5.9% to
$43.9bn. In parallel, the gross
market debt accounted for about
65% of total public debt. Gross
market debt is the total public
debt less the portfolios of the
Central Bank, the National
Social Security Fund, bilateral
and multilateral loans, as well
as Paris II and Paris III
related debt.
Could Greek Debt Tragedy
Morph into a Lehman Meltdown Market Crash?
alwikala.com
-
The Greek crisis has brought sovereign debt to the forefront, capturing markets' attention. We think another dimension of the sovereign issue, the inflation risks inherent in high levels of public debt for economies that can print their own currency, is being overlooked by the markets. High levels of public debt in many advanced economies raise the spectre of inflation, in our view: if high debt is deemed undesirable, but the political will for higher taxes and lower spending
although present might not materialized in the coming budget as
political consensus remains fragile over such tax issues, then ‘soft default' through inflation becomes a possibility.
Recently, a research by Morgan and Stanley has tried to put some numbers on the inflation risks inherent in the current and prospective US fiscal position (see
The Return of Debtflation?
February 10, 2010). Even if we look at a hypothetical scenario whereby
Lebanese policymakers attempt to stabilise debt to GDP at the current 160% level over the next ten years;
debtflation is bound to be the next reality .
I. Why Debtflation Is Possible
Interest payments, as a share of GDP, remain constant. True, this is a strong assumption. But even if interest to GDP increases with inflation, we don't think it will be by enough to prevent substantial debt erosion - at least for some time. Here's why.
The
Figures released by the
association of banks in Lebanon
indicate that gross public debt
reached LP 77,024 billion , or
US $ 51.1 billion , at end
-2009, up by 8.7% from end-2008.
Net public debt, which deducts
public sector deposits at
commercial banks and the central
bank from gross public debt ,
rose by 6.3 % from end -2008 to
reach LP 66,502 billion , or US
$ 44.1 billion by end-2009. The
rise in Lebanon’s gross public
debt throughout 2009 has
primarily been the result of
growing local currency gross
debt, which totaled LP 44,976
billion ,up by 15.3% from end
-2008, while foreign debt
increased by a trifling 0.5%
What matters most for successful debtflation, our colleagues rightly point out, is whether the (effective, i.e., maturity-weighted) nominal interest rate on the debt can be pushed below the rate of growth of nominal GDP. Put another way, the question is whether, and for how long, inflation can lower the
effective real interest rate on the debt. We believe that's possible for a sustained period: debt does not roll instantaneously; and bond yields are slow to incorporate changes in inflation. These two factors can be thought of as the crucial frictions that allow for debt erosion.
1. Debt maturities
The fact that the whole stock of
debt does not roll every period
means that the effective nominal
interest rate on the debt is
slow to respond to an increase
in market yields. For the US,
average maturity on Treasury
debt is poised to exceed the
postwar average of about 5 years
by the end of fiscal 2012
(September), on our forecasts.
The implication is that even if
market yields were to adjust
instantaneously to the higher
inflation regime, effective
nominal interest rates on the
debt would respond only
partially. So there is a debt
erosion effect even if inflation
were to be perfectly
anticipated.
2. Yields are slow to adjust to
a new inflation regime
Inflation - especially a change
in the inflation regime - is
rarely, if ever, perfectly
anticipated. Inflation
expectations lag behind actual
inflation. In turn, bond yields
lag behind inflation
expectations. Evidence is
abundant:
• Historically, yields lag
behind inflation. Throughout the
1970s, bond yields never
meaningfully caught up with the
inflation takeoff: real interest
rates were mostly very low -
indeed negative for sustained
periods - a bad time for bonds.
Exactly the opposite happened
during the Great Moderation of
the 1980s and 90s. The sustained
decline in inflation meant real
interest rates were high, giving
rise to a long bull market for
bonds.
This case was strongly
demonstrated in the New Eurobond
issue which was oversubscribed,
and the fact that Treasury bills
issuance suspended; the treasury
cannot sustain high yields
anymore. There is an excess of
liquidity in the market that is
also coupled with a high
appetite for susbscribing in
government paper. Hence; the
debt is inflated.
The Ministry of Finance declared
that it raised its Eurobond
issue $1.2bn from $1bn
originally due to increase
demand, as the issue was three
times oversubscribed . The new
issue has a 10-year maturity of
March 2020 and carries a coupon
rate of 6.375% paid semi-
annually . Domestic subscribers,
mainly commercial banks ,
accounted for 70% of
subscriptions and were allocated
amounts on a prorate basis ,
with the balance of 30%
subscribed by non-resident
institutions.
This is still high for a
country like Lebanon. The
ministry previously announced
that it is issuing new Eurobonds
under the Republic of Lebanon’s
Global Medium Term Note Program,
and that proceeds will be used
to refinance upcoming maturities
in March. The government has
$2.15bn in Eurobonds maturing
this year , of which $1.1bn
mature this month .,In parallel
, the ministry announced that
will suspend temporarily the
issuance of Lebanese
pound-denominated Treasury bills
, as it plans to use its excess
liquidity to finance the
government’s operations.
Net public debt at $44bn at
end-January 2010
Lebanon’s gross public debt
reached $51.6bn at the end of
January 2010 , up 1.1% from
$51.1bn at end-2009 , and
constituting an increase of 9.9
% from end-January 2009.
Domestic debt increase by 16.6%
to $30.4bn , while external debt
increased by 1.5% annually to
$21.3bn.Local currency debt
accounted for 58.8% of gross
public debt at end-January 2010
compared to 55.4% at end-January
2009,while foreign
currency-denominated debt
represented 41.2% of the total
relative to 44.6% a year
earlier. Market issued Eurobonds
account for about 67% of
external debt. Commercial banks
accounted for about 60%of the
total public debt at the end of
2010 compared to 56% at the end
of 2009. They were followed by
the Central Bank with 19%
relative to 20.1% at end-2009 ,
while public agencies ,
financial institutions and the
general public accounted for
10.5% of the debt relative to
9.7% at
end-2009.Further,multilateral
and bilateral loans represented
5.6% of the debt compared to
6.2% at end-2009 , while other
holders accounted for the
remaining 5.1%. In parallel,
residents held 89.3% of the
public debt at the end of 2010,
up from 85.7% at end-2009. Net
public debt, which excludes the
public sector’s deposits at the
Central Bank and at commercial
banks from overall debt figures
, increased annually by 5.9% to
$43.9bn. In parallel, the gross
market debt accounted for about
65% of total public debt. Gross
market debt is the total public
debt less the portfolios of the
Central Bank, the National
Social Security Fund, bilateral
and multilateral loans, as well
as Paris II and Paris III
related debt.
(in % )
2007
2008
2009
Change*
Nominal
GDP (1) ($ bn )
25
29.3
32.7
External
Debt / GDP
84.9
72.2
65
720
Local
Debt / GDP
83.2
88.3
91.2
290
Total
Debt / GDP
168.1
160.5
156.2
430
Trade
Balance /GDP
36
43.2
39
420
Exports /
Imports
23.8
21.6
21.5
10
Budget
Revenues / GDP
23.2
24
25.8
180
Budget
Expenditures / GDP
33.4
33.9
34.8
90
Budget
Balance / GDP
10.2
10
9
100
Primary
Balance/ GDP
2.9
2
3.3
130
BdL FX
Reserves / M2
59.4
68.9
75.1
620
M3/GDP
239.3
234.3
251
1,670
Bank
Assets / GDP
329
321.7
352.4
3,070
Bank
Deposits /GDP
269.1
265.5
292.9
2,740
Private
Sector Loans /GDP
81.7
85.5
86.8
130
Dollarization of
Deposits
77.3
69.6
64.5
510
Dollarization of Loans
86.4
86.6
84
260
Fiscal deficit at 2.3% of
expenditures in January 2010
Figures released by the Finance
Ministry show that fiscal
deficit reached $17.7m in
January 2010 compared to $300m
in January 2009. The deficit was
equivalent to 2.3% of total
budget and Treasury expenditures
compared to 27.3% in January
2009. Overall government
expenditures reached $770.4m ,
down 30.8% year-on-year , while
total revenues decreased by 7.5%
to $752.7m in January 2009.Tax
revenues improved by 11%
year-on-year to $646.2m ,of
which 41.3%, or $267m , were in
VAT receipts that posted a 12%
annual rise. Tax revenues
accounted for 93.2% of budgetary
revenues and for 85.8% of total
Treasury and budgets receipts.
The distribution of other tax
revenues show that income tax
receipts grew by 14.5% to $148m
, customs revenues were nearly
unchanged year-on-year at
$141.4m, real estate
registration fees improved by
78% to $39m , stamp fees
increased by 8% to $29.6m,
income from taxes on goods &
services rose by 10.8% to
$16.3m. Also, revenues from
inheritance tax regressed by
14.3% to $2.6m and revenues from
built property taxes dropped by
59.7% to $2.3m. Further, the
distribution of income tax
revenues shows that taxes on
wages & salaries accounted for
43% of total income tax
receipts, followed by tax on
interest with 28%, and taxes on
profits with 23%. In parallel,
non-tax budgetary revenues
contracted by 75.4% to $46.8m,
with administrative fees &
charges declining by 11% to
$27.5m and revenues from
government properties dropping
by 91.4% to $13.1m.
Debt servicing regressed by 26%
year-on-year to $212.5m,
accounting for 27.6% of total
expenditures and for 32% of
budgetary spending. It absorbed
28.2% of overall revenues and
30.7% of budgetary receipts.
Excluding debt servicing, the
primary surplus reached $248.2m,
or 37.4% of budget expenditures
compared to a surplus of $410m,
or 62.5% a year earlier. The
overall primary surplus reached
$201.2m ,or 26.2 % of total
spending compared to a deficit
of $7m , or 0.6% of total
expenditures a year earlier
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